In the first post-war years in agriculture the negative tendencies which had initially character of gradually developing preconditions of future crisis began to be bared.
So, in 1949 — 1953 average annual collecting the grain made only 4,9 billion poods at average in the country of productivity of 7,7 c/hectare that was only few more, than in 1910 — 1914 (respectively 4,4 billion poods and 7,0 c/hectare). Contrary to the declarations which were heard from a tribune of the XIX congress of CPSU, gross collecting grain in 1952 gave not 8, but 5,6 billion poods (if to consider not on bunker weight and losses from storage, probably and that are less). Even after withdrawal at collective farms and state farms of all seed material it was succeeded to prepare only 2,1 billion poods of bread, i.e. it was available obvious deficiency of requirement.
In Kazakhstan in days of the first post-war five-years period (1946 — 1950) of the statistician I fixed the average annual productivity equal to indicators of 1913 (5,6 c/hectare). Average annual gross collecting grain was smaller, than in 1928, and government procurements () conceded in average annual calculation on the volumes to level of 1941.
In a most serious condition there was a republic animal husbandry. In 1951 only 4,5 million heads of cattle (in 1928 — 6,5 million),' 1,5 million horses (3,5 million), 127 thousand camels (1 million) were. And only on sheep owing to their bigger biological reproduktivnost it was succeeded to come nearer to level of 1928 in their 1951 was 18 036, whereas in 1928 — 18 566 thousand.
In a post-war five-years period (1946 — 1950) rather noticeable motions were traced, i.e. as a whole it gave a certain recovery effect and an impulse to further development of a national economy.
However seeming "positive" of post-war development in the USSR grows dim against comparisons with post-war development of Germany and Japan — the countries which were injured in World War II a crushing defeat. Here restoration of the destroyed economy (and in the subsequent and its fast movement to "Economic miracle") was provided especially at the expense of reformatory reorientation of economic policy to market imperatives. In our country restoration of a national economy was carried out, mainly, thanks to enthusiasm and patriotism of the people, heroically and selflessly working for the Homeland benefit.
Behind externally safe indicators of a post-war five-years period there was a hard labor of rural workers, poverty and hunger, operation of child and Gensky labor, low level of life expectancy, the royal standards of physical wear of the population.
Thus, estimating results of post-war restoration and agriculture development, it is necessary to tell that these processes took place without thanking, and contrary to the system, continuing to hold down the greatest energy of masses, the huge potential of labor self-sacrifice put in the nature of the people.
On September (1953) Plenum of the Central Committee of CPSU the question of weakening of economic and political pressure upon the peasantry for the first time was raised. Understanding that the boundless robbery of the village can't proceed more, N. Khrushchev started introducing in party solutions of idea on mitigation of the state tax, increase in agrarian sector of investments. In this regard a number of measures for redistribution of the national income in favor of the village was undertaken: the tax policy is changed, the purchase and procuring prices are raised.
At the same time the new management started showing understanding of lameness of former orientation to the external economic methods of coercion. It was expressed in refusal of some establishments otrabotochny, in fact feudal, systems with its strictly fixed minimum of workdays (in 1948 — 1952).
Departure from the Stalin rigid line soon yielded result. Already in reply to the first adjustments in an agrarian policy the collective-farm peasantry answered with the noticeable growth of agricultural production.
The collective-farm and state-farm system created by Stalin all years of the existence in principle didn't leave a condition of permanent crisis. Such economy deprived of the mechanism of self-organization and internal impulses of self-development, could though somehow work only within cruel totalitarian and repressive system. At the slightest ease of the last it fell. Therefore even insignificant reforms bared defects and deep contradictions, long ago and latently developing in agriculture.
In the conditions of population growth, especially the cities and industrial centers, the need for grain again sharply increased. Meanwhile, as it was noted above, in 1953 in the country prepared slightly more than 31 million t of grain, having spent 32 million t. Shortage should be filled from the state reserves.
Everything said that collective farms and state farms don't cope with the main function — providing society with the food.
Recovery from the crisis assumed the radical decision, namely: deep transformation of system of relations of production, i.e. transition to the market, and also inclusion of personal master's interest. It is clear that similar succession of events wasn't discussed at all.
For self-preservation the system chose much more habitual, extensive, model of a solution. It was supposed to soften (and then and to eliminate) food crisis at the expense of sharp increase in a grain wedge. In this regard it was headed for a raspashka of huge land massifs in the east of the country.
In this sense the virgin soil played a role of a negative factor as worked on reanimation of system entering into a coma, having delayed its agony for for many years.
Opponents of this approach usually claim that Khrushchev simply had no other exit because lifting of grain production in traditionally developed agricultural areas was at that time impossible owing to backwardness of chemical branch, i.e. the industry of fertilizers.
Meanwhile the idea of the virgin soil which has been put forward by February-March (1954) by Plenum of the Central Committee of party, at all had no inevitable and necessary character.
If to consider a virgin soil in a prism of modern social and economic and political realities, its role for the republic is undoubted. In many respects thanks to it nowadays in Kazakhstan 2 thousands kg of grain are made per capita much more, than. Meanwhile, according to world practice to solve a food problem, it is enough to have an indicator within 1 thousand kg. Such countries is in the world some (Canada, Australia, the USA, Denmark, France, Hungary, Romania). From here it is clear that in principle Kazakhstan has all preconditions not only for ensuring own requirements, but also for an exit to the world market of grain as the export country. These opportunities especially increase if to consider that 90 — 95% of the world cultivated areas which are taken away under wheat, occupy soft wheat. On the virgin lands of Kazakhstan mainly firm wheat, its strong grades, differing is made by high protein content. Meanwhile it is known that the increase in protein in grain only for one percent is equivalent (on collecting grain) to productivity increase on — 7 c with hectare. Quality of grain affects and increase of material inputs. So, from 100 kg of the flour made from low-technological grain, bake 91 kg of highly nourishing bread. From here it is obvious that wishing to buy virgin wheat in the world much.
However, if to distract from the today's problems having passing character, and to try to consider a question in a context of such moments as ecological rationality, economic feasibility and social efficiency (the political foreshortening is given above), will come to light much and negative sides of the virgin epic.
In the first years, 1957 — 58 as a result of unprecedented raspashka dusty storms on easy soils in the Pavlodar region began, and at the beginning of the 60th processes of blowing captured the earth of all virgin region, and both on lungs, and on heavy soils.
By 1960 in Northern Kazakhstan more than 9 million hectares of soils that equaled then approximately all agricultural area of such country as France were subject to a wind erosion. However, soil-protective systems of agriculture, in particular bezotvalny processing of the soil further were developed. However, as environmental professionals note, any actions in their modern forms, as a rule, only soften, but don't provide necessary ecological environment protection.
The role of huge raspashka and on global increase of dryness (we will tell, from 1960 to 1985, i.e. from 25 years 23 years were in regions of virgin Kazakhstan, the Bottom Volga, etc. droughty) is revealed.
Having headed for a virgin soil reflecting strategy of globally extending (extensive) environmental management, the party and state management ignored the all-humanitarian principle "Earth — our general house", having taken that on itself moral responsibility for the future ecological cataclysms.
As for the economic feasibility, that this aspect is difficult illustrated because such calculations of the statistician I didn't conduct.
Nevertheless, if to consider that about 1,5 — 2 c of grain "are fixed" into virgin hectare, and gathers no more (on the average) 6 — 9 (in 1954 — 1958 average productivity was at the level of 7,3 c/hectare, and in 1961 — 1965 — 6,1 c/hectare), the question of economic feasibility will appear the very actual. The size of costs of production was influenced also by scales of attraction of a manpower. Annually on a virgin soil, on harvesting the mass of students, city dwellers, combine operators, machine operators from other areas and the republics was attracted.
Every harvest on a virgin soil tens army autobaht and the divisions of soldiers of a reserve delayed from civil production were sent. All this, certainly, affected profitability of grain production, its prime cost. Power expenses (fuels and lubricants) which grew owing to open spaces of the virgin state-farm lands (already one transportation of bread from fields to a state-farm grain flow were huge also demanded excessive number of energy carriers).
The virgin soil generated a number of the social, negative moments. Certainly, she played a big role in creation in Northern Kazakhstan extensive social and production infrastructures, emergence new and rough blossoming of the old cities of the region, creation of a huge sociocultural and ethnocontact zone and, as a result, internationalization of public life.
At the same time growth of the population of virgin areas by 61% is carried out at the expense of interrepublican migration. Among the arrived new settlers the main contingent was made by natives of Ukraine, RSFSR, Belarus, Moldova. Average population density increased in Northern Kazakhstan with 3,3 to 6,8 persons on 1 sq.km that in principle already in itself it is necessary to consider as the positive phenomenon.
However extensiveness of a migratory stream had also negative result. So, donor regions, i.e. regions sources of migratory streams turned from trudoizbytochny in trudonedostatochny and for today keep the sharpest deficiency of labor (for example, Non-Black Earth Region). At the same time uncontrollable migration promoted that the specific weight of radical ethnos in the republic decreased to 30%. As a result there was an objective threat to language and sociocultural institutes of the Kazakh ethnos, to development of other factors of its life support. And it couldn't but be reflected in all complex of the international relations.
By the beginning of the 60th it became obvious that the command system completely sputtered out. Life demanded expansion of an initiative and independence of the enterprises, strengthening of cost accounting and consequently, and radical changes in planning and organizational structure, and the infinite chain of the unreasoned reorganization which are carried out by N. Khrushchev, didn't give effect more and more.
New party leadership led by L.Brezhnevym and the government headed by A.Kosygin, began the activity with attempt of the next cosmetic reforming of separate elements of system.
In estimates of economic reform of 1965 there is a lot of inconsistent, however a platitude is recognition of incompleteness of the decisions made then. First of all it should be noted that reform concerned only some spheres of economy. Transformations didn't cover political system, the social relations, spiritual and ideological life of society. But also in economy reform concerned only separate means of economic management and didn't extend on all integrity of an economic mechanism. Many intentions and remained at declarative level. The idea of self-financing gradually evolved towards local experiments that, finally, nullified everything.
Nevertheless, separate elements of reform gave a temporary scope to economy development. Results of the eighth five-years period (1966 — 1970) of one of the best in the history of the country showed it, in particular.
The gross public product increased in Kazakhstan for these years by 1,5 times. Volume industrial производстваувеличился by 1,6 times. By the five-years period end, in 1970 of 70% of a gain of production in industrial sector it was received for the account of increase of production efficiency, whereas in 1965 — 40%.
Some motions occurred and in agriculture. The gain in production of gross agricultural output made 28% in the second half of the 60th years, and labor productivity in collective farms and state farms increased in comparison with the previous fifth anniversary by 1,8 times.
In a word, everything said that the economy of Kazakhstan has huge potential.
The republic turned into the unique agricultural area. 11% of production potential of agriculture of the country were the share of it.
However all this huge economic potential was held down by system and non-market imperatives, in many respects doing an economy course ineffective, and sometimes and single. Vseeto especially amplified in the next years which have become history as the period of stagnation.
