Since 2014, China’s far-western Xinjiang region has been the site of a sweeping security and assimilation campaign. The government detained Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui and other Muslims in “reeducation” camps, aiming to secularize and assimilate them and to erase Xinjiang’s distinct past. This crackdown alarmed neighboring Kazakhstan, which shares a long border and 1.6 million ethnic Kazakhs with Xinjiang. Kazakh activists have fled across the border to testify about camp detentions, but Kazakhstan’s government has remained cautious, mindful of deep Chinese investment and key Belt and Road ties.
Jeffrey Mankoff argues that China’s policy toward Xinjiang and other Inner Asian borderlands is rooted in historical narratives. Beijing portrays dynastic expansions as part of an unbroken national story: both the Qing dynasty’s conquests and the CCP’s later control are framed as “national reunification,” not foreign colonization. In this view, regions once governed with shifting autonomy are now treated as inseparable parts of a continuous Chinese state.
From Empire to Nation: How the Qing Legacy Shaped Modern China
China’s modern state evolved from a selective reading of empire. Only in the late nineteenth century did the Qing emperors formally integrate Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia and Manchuria into the imperial administration. This allowed Chinese nationalists to claim the empire’s vast domains as inherently “Chinese.” However, these integration drives provoked resistance. The 1911 revolution that toppled the Qing was marked by anti-Manchu violence and even by declarations that “in building a China for the Chinese, there is no place” for Tibetans or Mongols. These tensions would shape later debates over ethnicity and nationhood.
In the Nationalist era (1911–49), leaders formally maintained the old Qing borders even as they controlled little beyond China proper. After 1949, the Communist Party inherited these contested frontiers. Mankoff explains that the CCP created ethnic autonomous regions as a compromise: Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and other areas were recognized to have special status, and local authorities were allowed to enact cultural and economic regulations reflecting their populations. Yet Chinese law stressed state unity above all: autonomy was permitted only insofar as it served the nation’s interests. Unlike a federal system, the PRC’s framework ensured that even autonomous regions remained under strict central oversight.
Over time, Beijing shifted back toward centralization. After 1989 the government launched massive development programs in the west. Roads, railways, pipelines and other projects poured wealth into Tibet, Xinjiang and the borderlands. Crucially, officials also encouraged young Han Chinese to move to these regions. These migrants and party cadres now run local schools, businesses and infrastructure, gradually reshaping society along Han-majority norms.
Manchuria: From Imperial Homeland to Forgotten Frontier
China’s three northeastern provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning) illustrate how a borderland can be absorbed into the core. This region was the ancestral homeland of the Manchus, who conquered China in 1644. Ironically, in early Qing times it was treated as an “ethnic preserve”: Han Chinese were banned from settling and the area was garrisoned by Manchu Bannermen.
Those restrictions eventually failed. By the late nineteenth century, foreign powers had penetrated Manchuria: Russia seized the large territory of Outer Manchuria in 1858–60, and Japan invaded the remainder in the 1890s. In 1932 Japan set up the puppet state of Manchukuo in this region, even installing the last Qing emperor, Puyi, as its nominal ruler. After World War II, Chinese leaders denounced the Manchu ruling clan as “traitors” and refused them any territorial autonomy. In effect, “Manchuria” ceased to exist as a distinct unit. Beijing absorbed the northeast provinces into the Chinese state as simply Chinese territory, insisting that the Qing empire was part of China’s own history. Today Manchuria gives little hint of its Qing-era identity: although over 10 million people identify as Manchu, almost none speak the Manchu language. Scholars warn that the near-erasure of Manchu heritage sets a precedent, showing how China can fully absorb a former borderland without sustaining a separate “ethnic homeland.”
Inner Mongolia: Prosperity at the Price of Identity
Inner Mongolia, though officially an autonomous region, has likewise been pulled into China’s mainstream. Under the Qing, Inner Mongol nobles were gradually integrated into the empire: their mobility was limited and Chinese farmers were settled on traditional Mongol pastures. When Outer Mongolia (today’s independent Mongolia) became independent in 1912, the Chinese government moved to bind Inner Mongolians more closely to Beijing.
In 1947, Inner Mongolian Communist leaders secured their region’s place within the PRC by founding the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. As Mankoff notes, the active participation of Inner Mongolian revolutionaries lent legitimacy to Chinese rule in the region and reconciled many Mongols to Communist governance.
However, subsequent campaigns eroded Mongol culture. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), Mongolian-language schools and Buddhist monasteries were attacked and Han migration continued unabated. Today only about 17% of Inner Mongolia’s population is ethnic Mongol. Mandarin Chinese dominates education, media and government, and many Mongols now lead urban, modern lives; intermarriage with Han is common.
Beijing has also co-opted Mongolian heritage into the Chinese national narrative. Inner Mongolia still uses the traditional Mongolian script (unlike independent Mongolia’s Cyrillic alphabet), and Chinese authorities promote Mongol figures like Genghis Khan as heroes of a shared history. Monuments such as Genghis Khan’s mausoleum in Inner Mongolia reinforce the idea that Beijing is the rightful custodian of Mongol traditions. Economically, Inner Mongols enjoy far higher living standards than their ethnic kinsmen abroad: roughly 4.2 million Mongols live in China (far more than Mongolia’s 2.85 million), and Inner Mongolia’s per capita GDP vastly exceeds that of the independent Mongolian state. This material advantage further undercuts any pull toward separatism.
Protests in Inner Mongolia have been rare. When they do occur, they typically involve local issues like land disputes, mining pollution or recent efforts to cut Mongolian-language education. Analysts note that Inner Mongolian identity is fragmented by tribal loyalties and lacks unifying religious institutions or an external figure (like Tibet’s Dalai Lama) to rally around. In Mankoff’s assessment, Inner Mongolia has steadily lost its character as a post-imperial borderland – it “has experienced only sporadic mobilization,” and its assimilation has proceeded with little upheaval.
Tibet: Faith, Resistance, and the Politics of Control
Tibet stands out as China’s most internationally visible borderland, largely because of the Dalai Lama, its exiled spiritual leader. Until 1959 the Dalai Lama was both the spiritual head of Tibetan Buddhism and the de facto political ruler of Tibet. From the Tibetan perspective, Communist rule ended a century in which Tibetans largely governed themselves; exiled Tibetans insist that after Qing rule ended in 1911, Tibet reverted to de facto independence, making China’s later claims illegitimate. Beijing counters that Tibet has been part of China since antiquity, and that Communist rule has brought Tibet into the “socialist road to development”.
Historically, Tibet alternated between independence and Chinese suzerainty. In the seventh through ninth centuries Tibet had its own empire, even sending armies into the Chinese heartland. During the Mongol Yuan dynasty, Tibetans paid tribute but were administered through a special Buddhist bureau, not integrated into the regular province system. The Qing dynasty (1644–1911) continued a form of indirect rule: Tibetan leaders were welcomed at the imperial court and given seals signifying Qing overlordship in Tibetan affairs.
Tensions rose in the early 20th century. In 1903–04 a British expedition marched into Lhasa and imposed a treaty limiting Qing influence and granting Britain trade privileges. Qing troops retaliated by sacking Lhasa, in a violent episode that left deep mistrust. After the Qing fell in 1911, Tibet expelled the remaining Qing officials and set up its own government. In 1914 Britain and Tibet signed the Simla Convention, which Britain and Tibet considered to give Tibet a measure of autonomy, but the Chinese government refused to ratify it.
When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, Mao initially took a conciliatory approach toward Tibet. Beijing courted the young 14th Dalai Lama as a partner in modernization. But when talks failed, Chinese troops marched in. In 1951 Tibet’s government was forced to sign a “Seventeen Point Agreement,” pledging to maintain Tibet’s political system and the Dalai’s authority while acknowledging Chinese sovereignty. In practice this echoed Qing-era indirect rule, but it was quickly undermined. A Tibetan uprising in 1959 was crushed, the Dalai fled to India, and Beijing abolished the old Tibetan government.
Following the uprising, China formally established the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 1965 and dismantled most Tibetan institutions. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), Buddhist monasteries were closed or destroyed and monks were secularized or persecuted. Nomadic lands were collectivized, and Chinese-style schools and offices spread across Tibet. Beijing also sealed Tibet’s borders to India and Nepal, isolating the Dalai Lama’s exile community and preventing foreign support for Tibetan separatism.
In recent decades, Beijing has emphasized development as a way to legitimize its rule in Tibet. Highways and a railway now connect Lhasa to China’s interior, integrating Tibet into the national economy. Although Tibetans remain over 90% of the TAR’s rural population, Han migration has made Han Chinese a majority in Lhasa and other cities. These Han professionals—teachers, engineers, officials—often side with Beijing. Mankoff notes that they form a vocal pro-government constituency during protests and unrest. At the same time, Beijing has co-opted the Tibetan religious hierarchy. It elevated the Panchen Lama (the Dalai’s subordinate) and eventually detained the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama as the 11th Panchen Lama, installing a state-approved candidate. In these ways, China has extended the Qing-era pattern of managing Tibetan Buddhism under Beijing’s control.
