In the 1940s, theorists within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) proposed a system of Minzu Regional Autonomy (MRA) designed to give Uyghurs and other non-Han peoples control over their own affairs while preserving Chinese sovereignty. The CCP proclaimed that the establishment of the XUAR had given Uyghurs unprecedented political influence, making the region's peoples dang jia zuo zhu — "masters in their own house."

Bovingdon argues, however, that the system presented as autonomy (self-government, zizhi) is, in reality, a form of heteronomy — rule by others. Rather than allowing non-Han peoples to become masters in their own house, the system was designed to keep them "in the house" under comprehensive control. The deliberate establishment of heteronomy was a preemptive strategy intended to prevent the emergence of a unified nationalist movement. Given that Uyghurs and other non-Han groups are effectively governed by Han officials acting on instructions from the central authorities, persistent dissatisfaction, anti-Party agitation, and protests become "entirely understandable."

Chinese strategists recognized that anti-Han sentiment, deeply rooted among Uyghurs after decades of "harsh, exploitative rule by Han warlords" before 1949, posed a serious challenge. As Bovingdon notes, however, this sentiment was counterbalanced by longstanding "religious, political, and cultural differences" among the region's peoples, including the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks.

Although these peoples occasionally cooperated in establishing short-lived independent governments during the twentieth century, such as the East Turkestan Republic of 1944–1949, these political entities often collapsed because of internal disagreements. The CCP saw these divisions as an "opportunity to pit groups against one another" and thereby manage the challenge of separatism more effectively. From the outset, the objective was to institutionalize divisions that would transform potential resistance into manageable administrative disputes, ensuring the continued existence of an "overtly colonial apparatus."

The establishment of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in October 1955 ostensibly gave the Uyghurs "nominal title to the entire territory." In practice, however, it created a "condominium of nested autonomies." This strategy of territorial division, introduced in stages beginning in 1953, was a "stroke of administrative genius."

The territorial division served two purposes. First, it reinforced the idea, dating back to the Republican period, that Xinjiang belonged to thirteen distinct minzu, thereby challenging historical Uyghur claims to the entire territory. Second, it counterbalanced the "overwhelming political and demographic weight of the Uyghurs," who were, and remain, the region's largest population group.

The Uyghurs found themselves divided and surrounded by territories assigned to other peoples, including Mongols, Kazakhs, Hui (Dungans), and Kyrgyz. This arrangement generated considerable antagonism both within and between non-Han groups, reducing the likelihood that the government would face a coordinated independence movement involving all of them.

The system was designed to ensure that the political and material interests of all other officially recognized groups, including the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, were, "to some extent, aligned with the central government and against the Uyghurs."

Administrative boundaries were often drawn arbitrarily, further undermining genuine autonomy. For example, the Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, which covers nearly one-third of Xinjiang's territory, was designated as an autonomous area for the Mongols, even though they accounted for just 35% of its population. Similarly, the Kyrgyz and Tajiks were granted autonomous prefectures and counties despite their relatively small populations.

Moreover, granting nominal autonomy to smaller groups created a paradox for the Uyghurs: in some of these smaller autonomous areas, including those designated for the Kyrgyz, the Uyghurs themselves "once again became a non-governing minzu."

The CCP thus not only used non-Han groups to divide the Uyghurs but also delegated a measure of authority to these groups to secure their loyalty and generate "horizontal tensions." As Bovingdon observes, granting smaller groups nominal autonomy and local authority effectively turned them into agents of the central government, exercising control over Uyghurs in their respective areas. This created conditions in which, for example, Kazakh police officers could abuse their limited authority to harass Uyghurs, who came to regard such treatment as commonplace.

To suppress discontent and subsequently overwhelm it through demographic change, the CCP employed a combination of military force and state-sponsored Han migration. Between 1950 and 1978, several million Han Chinese were resettled in Xinjiang, increasing their share of the population from approximately 5% to more than 40%.

A key instrument of this policy was the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). The Corps was established in 1949 through the redeployment of demobilized soldiers. It is a paramilitary organization that has remained overwhelmingly Han in composition, with Han Chinese accounting for approximately 90% of its membership in 1994. Its units were deployed along the borders of "troubled regions" and at major transportation hubs. An examination of the XPCC's deployment, particularly its heavy concentration in densely populated Uyghur areas such as Kashgar and Aksu, suggests that its primary purpose was not to defend against external threats but to "counter Uyghur agitation for an independent Xinjiang."

The XPCC functions as an autonomous, extraterritorial entity governed directly from Beijing, making it a persistent source of demographic, economic, and military pressure on the region's indigenous peoples. Its activities have created economic monopolies and prompted complaints from farmers about the depletion of aquifers. The resulting rise in anti-Han sentiment has transformed an ideological conflict into a struggle over essential resources.

From its inception, the MRA system operated as an "overtly colonial apparatus." The leaders of autonomous regions are, in effect, appointed or delegated by the CCP authorities. Ultimate authority at every administrative level is "reserved for trusted Han Chinese" brought in from China's interior.

The CCP selected and promoted Uyghur and other non-Han officials to positions of authority only when their policies were "consistent with CCP objectives." This resulted in the systematic selection and promotion of "compliant" leaders. The proportion of non-Han Party members remained considerably lower than their share of the population: in 1994, they accounted for 36.7% of Party membership despite making up more than 60% of the population. This disparity points to the systematic exclusion of non-Han peoples from the actual levers of Party control.

This practice, which often overlooked talented mid-level non-Han officials for promotion, fostered a perception among the population that their leaders were xayin (spies and traitors) appointed by the Han authorities. Such perceptions undermined the legitimacy of any supposedly "autonomous" government and deepened feelings of betrayal.

The CCP employs so-called preferential policies (youhui zhengce) in areas such as family planning and education, including lower university admission score requirements. Although supporters of the system argue that these measures place non-Han peoples in a more advantageous position than their Han counterparts in Xinjiang, Bovingdon's analysis shows that such benefits do not address the underlying systemic inequalities.

Non-Han peoples remain less urbanized, poorer, and, crucially, almost entirely excluded from the most profitable and rapidly expanding sectors of the economy, such as the oil industry and private enterprise, where official quotas do not apply.¹ Rather than creating equal opportunities, these policies conceal an underlying system in which economic disparities continue to widen.

Dissatisfaction with CCP policies also manifested itself through collective action. For example, the CCP's attempts to introduce collectivization in the mid-1950s, intended to mobilize peasants against the elites, had the opposite effect: many Uyghurs and members of other ethnic groups united against the Party.

A pivotal moment illustrating the depth of this alienation was the mass exodus of 1962, when more than sixty thousand Uyghurs and Kazakhs fled across the border into the Soviet Union. The exodus was driven both by resentment of the CCP's domestic policies and by active Soviet radio propaganda promoting the prospect of better living conditions. The CCP responded by immediately sealing the border and forcibly relocating thousands of families away from the border area, fearing that those who had fled would receive military training and support "Soviet social imperialism."

The strategy of "nested autonomy" proved effective in generating internal antagonisms. Geopolitical developments further intensified these institutionalized divisions. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the independence of the Central Asian republics, Kazakhs reportedly taunted Uyghurs by saying, "We have our own country, and you don't." This illustrates how administrative divisions and competing interests had taken hold: an external event that might have galvanized a broader Turkic movement instead deepened internal divisions. Fights between Uyghur and Kazakh students were also reported in university dormitories.

However, when faced with shared cultural and religious grievances, these communities could temporarily overcome their internal differences. One example was the mass demonstration in Urumqi in 1989, sparked by the publication of a book considered offensive to Muslims. Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Hui, and other Muslims participated in the protest together, posing a greater challenge to the CCP because it demonstrated the potential for a united front.

The CCP's plans included language reforms aimed at gradually eroding distinct ethnic identities and promoting assimilation. The history of Turkic languages in Xinjiang has been marked by politically motivated changes in writing systems. In the mid-1950s, with Soviet assistance, a transition to the Cyrillic script was introduced to reduce the religious influence of Islam, associated with Arabic as the language of the Quran. In the 1960s, following the Sino-Soviet split, a Latin-based alphabet was introduced to sever written connections with the peoples of Central Asia and facilitate possible convergence with romanized Chinese. The return to the Arabic script in 1980 was a CCP tactic aimed at restoring loyalty in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.

Although the official slogan called for "Equal proficiency in Chinese and minority languages" (Min Han jiantong), in practice it meant one-sided pressure on non-Han peoples to learn Chinese. This is illustrated by the fact that shortages of interpreters in government institutions primarily disadvantage non-Han officials rather than their Han counterparts. This arrangement helps ensure that Chinese remains the lingua franca and the language of administration.

In Xinjiang, religious faith is "essentially synonymous with group identity" for many minzu. Consequently, the government's treatment of religion is perceived as a reflection of its attitude toward the people themselves.

Following the Baren incident in 1990 and the independence of neighboring Central Asian states, the CCP abandoned its policy of relative religious tolerance. It began cracking down on "illegal religious activities," closing "unnecessary" mosques, and targeting unofficial religious schools. These policies affected Muslims across ethnic lines, including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Hui.

Party members and students were openly denied freedom of religion. Officials were granted only the "freedom not to believe," effectively imposing atheism as the sole permissible form of religious "freedom." The introduction of compulsory "Atheism Education" classes for adolescents, ostensibly intended to enable them to make a "scientific" choice, amounted in practice to forced ideological indoctrination. This created conflicts of loyalty among ethnic elites and further deepened their alienation from the authorities.

Bovingdon's analysis shows that, of the two principal objectives of the MRA system — preserving China's territorial integrity and granting non-Han peoples control over their own affairs — the CCP achieved only the first, through military presence and demographic change. The second objective was an unequivocal failure.

The MRA system failed to weaken ethnic consciousness. Rather than encouraging Uyghurs and other peoples to develop a broader identification with the "Chinese nation," CCP policies based on heteronomy, cultural restrictions, and economic exploitation produced profound alienation and a stronger sense of distinct ethnic identity.

A sense of betrayal prevails among Uyghurs and other non-Han groups. They believe that severe restrictions threaten the survival of their cultures, that Han Chinese benefit disproportionately from the region's resources, and that their homeland has been placed firmly under the control of the military and the XPCC's paramilitary apparatus.

Discontent in Xinjiang is widespread and extends far beyond political activists. It affects every segment of society:

Professionals: Doctors express concern about the suppression of public health statistics, including disease rates in areas affected by nuclear testing; lawyers point to the absence of local autonomy legislation; and educators complain about censorship of history and literature.Economically active groups: Businesspeople resent preferential treatment of XPCC enterprises, while farmers complain about economic exploitation and the depletion of aquifers caused by XPCC activities.Religious communities: There are widespread complaints about restrictions on religious practices, which these communities regard as an integral part of their social and cultural lives.

As a result, a climate of profound and pervasive distrust of the government has taken hold in the region. Non-Han residents believe that the authorities "systematically lie about every important issue."

Although military force has neutralized the immediate threat of secession, Bovingdon argues that the desire for "genuine autonomy" or even independence is almost universal among the non-Han population. The strategic use of the interests of Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other groups to counterbalance the Uyghurs has helped preserve China's territorial integrity. Yet the cost of this strategy has been not a reduction in alienation, but its persistent intensification, accompanied by growing discontent. This, in turn, ensures that the struggle for self-determination will continue into the future.