Introduction

Kazakhstan stands on the threshold of becoming the first Eurasian country to chair the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), assuming this role in 2010 and entering the OSCE troika in 2009. For the leadership, this represents a form of international recognition of Kazakhstan’s rapidly emerging global role since its independence from the Soviet Union. During this period, Kazakhstan abandoned the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the USSR, began harnessing its vast energy resources, and maintained political stability compared to some other Central Asian states in transition. It has also taken an active part in the War on Terror, strengthened ties with NATO through the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and pursued defense relations with the United States and other NATO members. At the same time, Kazakhstan has promoted regional cooperation through organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), while carefully balancing its bilateral relations with both China and Russia.

In terms of foreign policy, Astana has pursued what it describes as a “multi-vectored” strategy, seeking to avoid privileging any one partner above another. However, as McDermott observes, when it comes to defense and security, such an approach is more difficult to sustain in practice, given the legal, historical, and political ties that inevitably draw Kazakhstan closer to some partners over others. While President Nursultan Nazarbayev has skillfully managed this balancing act, recent strains in Russia–West relations following the five-day war in Georgia in August 2008 present new challenges.

According to McDermott, Kazakhstan’s cooperation with the United States and NATO has often been shaped less by deep systemic military reform than by efforts to project a positive image internationally, highlighting its more capable formations in exercises and joint activities. This suggests that the country’s defense policy has at times prioritized international perception and prestige over the development of comprehensive capabilities to address future security threats.

Military Reform or Structural Changes? 

Since independence, Kazakhstan has introduced notable changes in the structures of its armed forces. Between 1992 and 2000, four ministers of defense served, each promoting somewhat different views on military reform, though these remained largely rooted in Soviet-era doctrine. Progress was slowed by economic difficulties, and until 1999 the state budget did not specify what share of GDP should be allocated to defense. For much of the 1990s, funding was primarily directed toward salaries, maintenance of facilities, and the acquisition of surplus Soviet equipment, with new materiel arriving mostly as compensation from Russia for the use of testing ranges.

Defense spending was not a high priority during this decade, and only began to rise in 2000 as Kazakhstan’s economic performance improved. In 2001, the defense budget reached 25 billion Tenge ($172 million), about 8 billion more than the previous year. Since then, expenditures have generally remained around 0.9 percent of GDP, and by 2004 the total had doubled compared to 2001, making it the highest in Central Asia. This growth created opportunities to modernize the security sector and begin planning for the reequipment of the armed forces. A new military doctrine was adopted in 2000, and the Armed Forces were reorganized into four Military Districts — Southern, Western, Eastern, and Central. Mobile Forces were created, and the number of contract servicemen increased to about 12,000. Kazakhstan’s forces were equipped with S-75, S-200, and S-300 air defense systems, alongside Su-25, Su-27, and MiG-29 aircraft.

In July 2001, Kazakhstan conducted its largest-ever military exercise in the southern regions, and with U.S. assistance began training commando units for counterinsurgency. Soviet-era equipment was refurbished, while the United States supplied new communications and mountain warfare gear. According to McDermott, while these developments marked progress, much of the reform process still carried the imprint of earlier Soviet thinking.

Since 1994, Kazakhstan has also benefited from U.S. security assistance programs, beginning with the International Military Education and Training (IMET) initiative. Turkey and Germany likewise offered officer training opportunities, and Kazakhstan participated in Canada’s Military Training and Assistance Program (MTAP). These exchanges helped build links with Western partners, although, as McDermott notes, officers trained abroad often faced challenges advancing their careers at home, and some chose to leave military service.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Excess Defense Articles programs were opened to Kazakhstan in 1997, but Astana relied on them only to a limited degree. McDermott highlights that the practical use of these programs was often directed by U.S. defense attachés, which sometimes resulted in acquisitions that did not fully correspond to the specific needs of Kazakhstan’s armed forces.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked a turning point in Kazakhstan’s defense policy, accelerating closer cooperation with the United States and NATO. Around the same time, Mukhtar Altynbayev returned as Minister of Defense in December 2001, following his earlier resignation in 1999. His reappointment provided fresh momentum for military reform and for expanding international defense partnerships. Altynbayev openly acknowledged the existence of significant management challenges within Kazakhstan’s armed forces, and his second tenure was characterized by efforts to modernize their structure. During the first decade of independence, for example, there had been no intermediate post between the Chief of the General Staff and district commanders. Upon resuming office, Altynbayev began addressing such gaps.

President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Decree on the Reform of the Armed Forces, signed on May 7, 2003, formalized several key changes:

The Committee of Chiefs of Staff was created, with responsibilities divided between the Ministry of Defense and the new body.

The Armed Forces were reorganized into three branches: Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces (including the Air Force), and the Navy. The existing Mobile Force was converted into an Airmobile Force, making it a distinct branch.

Military districts were restructured into regional commands (West, East, South, and Astana) to encourage closer inter-service coordination.

According to McDermott, these reforms were influenced by collaboration with U.S. and NATO experts and signaled a cautious shift toward Western models of defense organization. The appointment of civilians to head the Committee for National Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and later the introduction of a civilian Minister of Defense, offered a public signal of strengthening civilian oversight, though the extent of its implementation remained limited.

Efforts to professionalize the armed forces were also closely linked with reforming the military education system. Beginning in 2003, Kazakhstan consolidated its training institutions to reduce duplication and improve efficiency. Steps were taken to introduce professional sergeants and expand contract service. Ambitious plans were announced in 2004 to increase the share of contract servicemen from 40 percent to 80 percent by 2005. Yet, as McDermott notes, these targets were only partially met and were not consistently supported by broader systemic reforms, which limited the full realization of professionalization goals.

Armed Forces: Strength and Structure. 

The principal driver for military reform in Kazakhstan was President Nazarbayev’s Decree of March 2003, which identified counterterrorism and the protection of national borders as top priorities. The decree also initiated reorganization of the main branches of the armed forces, which, in addition to the Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, and the Missile Troops and Artillery, now also included the Navy and Airmobile Forces. This transition envisaged moving from a division/regiment structure toward a more flexible brigade system, incorporating Western training standards, enhancing professionalism, and strengthening logistical support. While the government clearly demonstrated resolve in developing military capabilities to address terrorism and transnational threats, McDermott notes that this emphasis was largely placed on strengthening the armed forces rather than allocating comparable resources to the police and investigative services. As a result, Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism strategy risked relying too heavily on military tools instead of building capacity in intelligence, analysis, and law enforcement.

Ground Forces. The Ground Forces number approximately 45,000. In 2003, a new structure was introduced: two corps-level regional commands (Southern and Eastern), two division-level regional commands (Western and Central), along with the Airmobile Forces, and the Missile Troops and Artillery. These reforms reflected Kazakhstan’s willingness to align more closely with Western partners in the War on Terror by making its military more efficient. At the same time, McDermott points out that these structural reforms underscored the continued limitations of the existing framework, particularly in rapid deployment capacity. The four regional commands encompassed one mechanized division (three tank regiments and one artillery regiment), one motor rifle division (one tank brigade, two motor rifle regiments, and one artillery regiment), one training center with two motor rifle regiments, one motor rifle training regiment, one tank training regiment, and one artillery regiment, three independent motor rifle brigades, two artillery brigades, and one engineer brigade. These commands are subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. According to McDermott, it is uncertain whether this restructuring represented a genuine functional improvement or more of an external reform to project an image of conformity with Western militaries.

The Ground Forces’ armament includes 884 main battle tanks (T-72s and T-62s), 2,090 armored combat vehicles (ACVs), and around 980 artillery pieces, all considered serviceable. However, large quantities of Soviet-era equipment — 2,680 tanks, 2,400 ACVs, and 6,900 artillery pieces — became unserviceable, and the Ministry of Defense planned their disposal. Increased defense funding in 2003 allowed for better support of personnel, training, and equipment maintenance. Yet, McDermott observes that Kazakhstani defense officials were at times slow to grasp that additional resources do not automatically translate into higher readiness. Russian-made armaments remain serviceable, though in some cases outdated for modern missions. While the officer corps is generally adequate, there is a persistent shortfall in skilled noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

Investment plans focus on improving living conditions for personnel and acquiring interoperable command and control systems. Apart from contracts for two new Mi-17 helicopters, however, there are few concrete plans for upgrading or replacing obsolete armament in the near future.

Navy. Development of Kazakhstan’s Navy in the Caspian Sea has progressed cautiously. Although the government committed to building naval capacity with some foreign assistance, the program has been contentious. Other Caspian littoral states voiced concern over the militarization of the region, while Russia has remained the dominant naval power with its Caspian flotilla. At present, Kazakhstan has no confirmed combat ships, relying only on a naval college. The missions and structure of the Navy remain under discussion. Plans aim for a functional Navy by 2010, including a command-and-control system, trained personnel, and appropriate vessels, though McDermott questions whether these ambitions would be realized on schedule.

Air Force. Kazakhstan’s Air Defense Forces (ADF) include both the Air Force and ground-based units, with an estimated strength of 13,000. The ADF is organized into nine air bases and a ground-based AD regiment. The air fleet includes 164 combat aircraft (40 MiG-29s, 14 Su-25s, 37 Su-24s, 14 Su-27s, 16 MiG-25s, and 43 MiG-31s), a number of transport aircraft (Tu-134, Tu-154), 137 helicopters (Mi-8, Mi-24, Mi-26), and numerous trainers. Ground-based forces operate about 150 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers (SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-6, and S-300). Kazakhstan planned to acquire two C-130 aircraft and two helicopters through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. While some aircraft are relatively modern, shortages of spare parts persist. All aircraft are kept in service except those scheduled for replacement. The average flying time for combat pilots is about 100 hours per year, with transport and helicopter pilots flying somewhat more. According to McDermott, these factors highlight serious challenges facing the ADF — from limited training hours to risks associated with aging aircraft and occasional accidents.

Reform and Its Limitation in the Regional Context. 

While Western defense cooperation has so far had only limited direct impact on the Central Asian militaries, these forces nonetheless continue to face significant challenges that, according to McDermott, can only be effectively addressed through more systemic reform. Without a comprehensive internal review and the political will to implement such reforms, the armed forces in the region may remain underdeveloped and reliant on external actors to address their security needs, especially in the event of a crisis.

In general terms, Central Asian militaries face several shared challenges:

Local armed forces often maintain larger structures than they can realistically operate or finance.

Units are not fully adapted to modern military requirements.

National defense infrastructure remains fragile, with limited command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities, as well as aging air defense systems.

The geography of the region — particularly in countries such as Kazakhstan with vast territory and long borders — demands significant resources for patrolling, protecting energy infrastructure, and conducting reconnaissance.

There is a risk of spillover from insurgencies in neighboring states, requiring prompt and flexible responses tailored to local conditions.

In some scenarios, forces may need to counter illegal armed groups, which necessitates robust capabilities and effective combat power.

Any reforms or operational plans must take into account the existing inventories of equipment.

As McDermott notes, the equipment in service across the region remains overwhelmingly of Russian origin, and Kazakhstan is no exception. In the medium term, until around 2015, this meant that militaries would continue to rely on Russian-made weapons and systems, focusing on upgrades and maintenance rather than large-scale replacement. While NATO-standard equipment might offer long-term benefits, it is costly and would require substantial investment in supporting infrastructure to maintain and operate. For this reason, Kazakhstan and its neighbors are more likely to procure equipment from Russia — often at preferential rates within the framework of the CSTO — or from other states within the CIS. This reliance, however, limits Kazakhstan’s options for diversifying its defense partnerships and broadening its international military cooperation policies.

Challenges Remain in Kazakhstan. 

Despite many years of “military reform” in Kazakhstan and repeated statements from the leadership about its progress, Defense Minister Daniyal Akhmetov has acknowledged that substantial challenges remain if these reforms are to succeed. During his visits to military barracks and educational centers after assuming office in January 2007, he often expressed concern at the state of facilities and discipline in the armed forces. In August 2007, while visiting units in the Pavlodar Region, Akhmetov announced that defense funding would increase significantly in line with the new military doctrine. At the same time, he openly pointed to staffing shortages, noting that only about 75 percent of the required officer posts were filled. He emphasized the need to expand the corps of officers, sergeants, and contract soldiers — all central elements in Kazakhstan’s effort to professionalize its armed forces. Akhmetov also stressed that quality, not just quantity, needed to improve. Accordingly, the Ministry of Defense planned “relevant training” for 3,095 officers in early 2008 as part of a broader attempt to address systemic weaknesses. The official priority remained the creation of a “strong, professional, and combat-capable army.” However, by mid-2008 the defense budget was reduced as Kazakhstan faced economic difficulties linked to the global credit crunch.

According to McDermott, the challenges to Kazakhstan’s military reform stem from interconnected political, institutional, cultural, and historical factors. Reform efforts have often lacked consistent political direction and have not been firmly tied to the country’s real security requirements. Official rhetoric frequently emphasized the goal of building mobile, small, and well-equipped professional forces, but in practice this highlighted the gap between stated ambitions and existing capacities. Since independence, Kazakhstan has adopted three different military doctrines, but without a sense of urgency in its threat assessments to drive genuine reform.

In practice, defense planners have tended to concentrate on selected parts of the armed forces, such as Special Forces, peace support units, and border guards, while much of the military remained largely unaffected. McDermott argues that reform efforts became intertwined with projects aimed at enhancing Kazakhstan’s international image — for example, by sending a small contingent of engineers from the peace support battalion (KAZBAT) to Iraq in 2003. International assistance was also constrained, since Kazakhstan has not sought NATO membership and thus has lacked external pressure to adopt higher standards in training, education, and combat readiness beyond a limited number of units. Within the Ministry of Defense, expertise on how to effectively manage and utilize Western assistance has often been insufficient, which further limited the overall impact of reform programs.

Washington’s Approach: 5-year Plans. 

In September 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) signed a five-year military cooperation plan with Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD). The United States committed to supporting Kazakhstan in areas ranging from the development of NATO-interoperable peace support forces and participation in NATO or United Nations (UN) operations, to training programs for non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Washington also aimed to assist with the development of Kazakhstan’s military infrastructure and its capabilities in the Caspian Sea region. That same year, Turkey signed a similar agreement and coordinated with the U.S. to establish a trilateral approach to supporting Kazakhstan’s armed forces.

Article Three of the bilateral plan outlined the following elements of assistance:

Create, train, and develop a NATO-interoperable rapid reaction unit capable of protecting offshore and coastal infrastructure, supported by regional counterterrorism training. 

Establish a regional cooperation center.

Develop rapid response capabilities to safeguard oil pipelines and other energy assets.

Build a Huey II helicopter unit to provide operational support in the Caspian.

Support the creation of Kazakhstan’s naval capabilities to monitor and patrol Caspian waters.

Develop the Naval Academy at Aktau to evolve into a training hub for counterterrorism, counternarcotics, search and rescue, and underwater operations.

The concept underpinning this cooperation plan was to give Kazakhstan the land, sea, and air capabilities necessary to protect its energy infrastructure in the Caspian region. It also envisaged the formation of NATO-interoperable rapid reaction elements that could participate in future NATO-led operations. According to McDermott, Washington hoped the plan would also promote stronger civil-military control, establish peace support forces, and contribute to the professionalization of Kazakhstan’s armed forces. Within the MoD, however, preference was often given to assistance that brought American equipment, such as HMMVEs, which were welcomed in Astana but did not always match the armed forces’ real operational needs.

In February 2008, Kazakhstan and the U.S. signed a new five-year cooperation plan for 2008–2013. This agreement built on earlier commitments and expanded into more ambitious areas, though, as McDermott notes, many of the original objectives had yet to be achieved. Kazakhstan’s first civilian Defense Minister, Daniyal Akhmetov, told then-CENTCOM Commander Admiral William Fallon that in parallel with introducing an automated control system (ACS), the MoD was also establishing a center to train ACS specialists. The plan envisaged broadening the study of American military experience and included more than 80 bilateral events, around 50 of which were to be held in Kazakhstan and the remainder in the U.S.

Yet, Western-trained personnel in Kazakhstan’s armed forces have faced several challenges:

They remain in the minority and can encounter resistance from within the system.

Their motivation to drive reform is often undermined by their limited influence on institutional practices.

Many with language and technical training leave for more lucrative opportunities in the commercial sector. 

Kazakhstan’s antiterrorist capability requirements have centered on four key areas: improving interagency coordination, enhancing mobility of high readiness units, reequipping domestic counterterrorist forces, and developing new doctrine to guide their effective use.

Western security assistance programs have primarily focused on border security and Special Forces. However, as McDermott emphasizes, they have generally not included coherent efforts to strengthen intelligence services — particularly in collection, analysis, and regional cooperation. U.S. assistance has also suffered from the absence of a phased, long-term strategy like Georgia’s Train and Equip Program (GTEP), and from a lack of coordination across more than 17 different funding channels. NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs, while improving general standards, have been too broad and generic to drive deeper institutional reform.

Overall, McDermott identifies several recurring weaknesses in external security assistance to the region:

1. Limited promotion of genuine cooperation between Central Asian states, which is vital for countering terrorism.

2. Insufficient regional expertise within Western planning staffs, given that Central Asia was a lower priority before 9/11.

3. Lack of structured coordination with Moscow or efforts to explore possible areas of joint cooperation.

4. A tendency — especially by U.S. planners — to supply equipment rather than engage in the more complex task of institutional reform.

5. Difficulties in sustaining long-term programs, due to U.S. budget cycles, CENTCOM priorities in Afghanistan and Iraq, and political constraints tied to assistance packages.

6. Finally, as seen in Georgia, focusing assistance narrowly on select units can widen the gap between them and the broader armed forces, a vulnerability that could be exploited by determined non-state actors.

Foreign Military Education. 

The education of Kazakhstani officers in the United States and at military academies of NATO member states has produced mixed results. While such programs were intended to raise professional standards within the armed forces, McDermott observes that many officers trained abroad have become disillusioned upon returning to Kazakhstan and, in significant numbers, have chosen to leave military service. Recent reporting indicates that of the 250 officers educated in the United States, 110 have already resigned, citing various reasons. Although graduates of foreign universities are contractually obligated to serve for at least 10 years, some have found ways to depart earlier.

Kazakhstani servicemen currently study in 160 specialist fields at 55 foreign universities. Each year, around 550 personnel are sent abroad for education: 300 for full-time programs and 250 for short-term courses. However, only about one-third of those who complete such training ultimately continue their careers within the Kazakhstani armed forces. Retention tends to be higher among senior officers attending shorter programs, but the greatest challenges, according to McDermott, lie with junior and mid-level officers, where attrition is most pronounced.

For instance:

Of the 114 cadets who studied in Turkey, 23 left the armed forces for employment in the civilian sector.

The case of Yelena Milyuk, Kazakhstan’s first female graduate of West Point, illustrates some of these difficulties. After entering West Point in 2001 and returning to Kazakhstan, her career ambitions were limited despite her prestigious education. Although she aspired to serve as a military attaché, she was assigned instead to logistical support in rear services. Dissatisfied, she pursued further postgraduate study at West Point, later married, and eventually left the Kazakhstani army.

McDermott emphasizes that such examples highlight the broader issue: while international education initiatives expand opportunities and skills, without parallel institutional reforms and clear career paths at home, Kazakhstan risks losing much of the talent it invests in abroad.

Embracing NATO. 

Kazakhstan’s cooperation with NATO has deepened as a result of its partnership with the United States in the War on Terror. However, McDermott emphasizes that this cooperation has never been politically driven by aspirations to join the Alliance. In that sense, Kazakhstan’s defense engagement with NATO remains limited in scope and cannot be directly compared to the more comprehensive integration achieved by states such as the Baltic countries or Eastern European members of NATO. The following sections outline the scope of Kazakhstan’s cooperation with NATO and identify some of the accompanying challenges. Importantly, McDermott cautions that, as with U.S. assistance programs, the Alliance’s emphasis on developing select high-readiness formations carries the risk of creating disparities within Kazakhstan’s armed forces, similar to the experience of Georgia in 2008, where select units trained by NATO proved unrepresentative of the overall force.

Kazakhstan’s partnership with NATO has evolved in several phases. In 1991, Kazakhstan joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a forum that promoted dialogue through seminars and symposia on defense, economics, science, and ecological issues. The decision to relinquish nuclear weapons in the early 1990s further enhanced Kazakhstan’s visibility within NATO. In 1994, relations entered a second stage as Kazakhstan joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program, prioritizing cooperation to strengthen training, defense planning, and peacekeeping readiness. Practical cooperation also extended to initiatives such as Science for Peace and the Virtual Silk Road. After a regional attempt to establish a Central Asian peacekeeping battalion (CENRASBAT) collapsed, President Nazarbayev announced in June 2000 that Kazakhstan would form its own peacekeeping unit, KAZBAT, with the aim of reaching NATO interoperability for participation in NATO- or UN-led operations. Developing such a unit required modern command and control, improved communications, enhanced military English, and training in peacekeeping tasks — a long-term process. 

A third stage of intensified partnership followed 9/11. Kazakhstan granted NATO forces access to its airspace and facilities for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In 2002, it became the first Central Asian state to join NATO’s Planning and Review Process (PARP), followed in 2003 by participation in NATO’s Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO). Steppe Eagle joint military exercises began in 2003 with the U.S. and UK. In 2004, Kazakhstan entered NATO’s Operational Capabilities Concept and received observer status at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. NATO also appointed a Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, highlighting the region’s growing importance.

A fourth stage came in 2006, when Kazakhstan and NATO endorsed an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) to coordinate cooperation in areas such as defense planning, reform, counterterrorism, border security, and science. NATO’s Special Representative Robert Simmons praised Kazakhstan’s progress during a 2008 visit, citing KAZBRIG as a successful example of NATO-standard interoperability. KAZBRIG had already taken part in demining operations in Iraq, and Simmons suggested that this success opened the door to broader cooperation.

NATO Interoperability and KAZBRIG.

Kazakhstan’s peace support operations (PSO) units are based in the Airmobile Forces headquartered in Kapchagai, which also serve the CSTO’s Collective Rapid Deployment Forces. The Airmobile Forces include three assault-storm brigades (1,785 personnel) and KAZBRIG. While KAZBRIG has undergone reforms with NATO involvement, the other formations remain primarily Soviet in structure, equipped with Russian hardware and lacking Western training. McDermott notes that this dual role — cooperation with NATO on one hand and obligations within CSTO on the other — leaves Kazakhstan balancing sensitive geopolitical choices.

NATO has sometimes presented its cooperation with Kazakhstan in overly optimistic terms. Since joining PARP in 2002, Kazakhstan has struggled to meet interoperability goals for its PSO units. Targets initially set for 2004 were repeatedly postponed. Achieving NATO standards required KAZBAT to modernize communications, logistics, strategic airlift, NBC defense, and military English training — tasks that advanced only gradually. McDermott highlights that Kazakhstan’s defense officials have at times been hesitant to fully adopt NATO doctrine, which slowed progress.

By NATO’s guidance, KAZBAT would need to include:

HQ and logistics support,

three assault-storm companies,

one fire support company,

one reconnaissance company,

one HQ company,

one administrative company,

one military police company, and

one medical platoon.

This was an ambitious undertaking. KAZBAT’s initial deployment to Iraq with U.S. airlift support involved only a small engineer unit, structured according to Soviet models with a disproportionately large officer corps. Steppe Eagle 2007 highlighted both progress and limitations: U.S. officials initially judged KAZBRIG “ready,” while U.K. counterparts raised concerns, leading Kazakhstan to delay declaring full interoperability. In 2008, as Kazakhstan prepared to chair the OSCE, efforts to demonstrate NATO readiness were accelerated. Reports indicated that NATO interoperability status would be granted in advance, suggesting the process had become partly politicized.

Ultimately, Kazakhstan achieved recognition as the first state in the region to field NATO-interoperable PSO forces. Yet McDermott stresses that it would likely take several more years before these forces could realistically deploy abroad, and even then Astana would face the sensitive political decision of where such units could operate.

NATO Interoperability: Military Language Training. 

In September 2005, Kazakhstan took a notable step toward advancing its military reform objectives and moving closer to NATO interoperability in selected units, particularly its peace support operations (PSO) formations. To address the challenge of improving military language training, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) established the Defense Institute for Foreign Languages (DIFL) in Almaty, with branches in Kapchagai, Shuchinsk, and Aktau. At the opening ceremony, Defense Minister Army General Mukhtar Altynbayev invited defense attachés from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, and Turkey. He explained that the new institute would prepare officers not only in interpretation but also in “regional studies,” emphasizing military intelligence analysis supported by knowledge of multiple languages. Initially, instruction was offered in Chinese, English, French, German, Korean, Turkish, and several other languages. Altynbayev noted that Kazakhstan had formed a full-cycle national system of military education, with programs designed to reflect emerging challenges and threats, and he emphasized that graduates should be valuable both to the armed forces and other security agencies.

Importantly, the minister also highlighted that DIFL would serve as a regional educational hub within NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework beginning in 2006, with the intention of opening its doors to military personnel from other Central Asian states. According to McDermott, the success of DIFL was expected to play a central role in shaping the effectiveness of Western security assistance programs. Support from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Turkey proved instrumental in making the institute a reality.

The DIFL was established as a successor to the earlier MoD Linguistic Center, which existed since 1998. However, the reorganization in 2005 introduced new challenges. Leadership appointments raised concerns: Colonel Talesbayev, a former military police officer with limited English skills, was named head of the institute, while Colonel Ualiyev, a former Air Force pilot without foreign language or teaching background, became deputy for curriculum and regional studies. McDermott notes that, instead of being staffed by experienced linguists, teaching responsibilities often fell to recent graduates with little pedagogical preparation, sometimes instructing cadets nearly their own age. Regional studies courses were in some cases based on material gathered from the internet, with limited expertise on neighboring Central Asian countries.

Although the MoD formally offered places for Kyrgyz cadets in 2006, none ultimately enrolled, underscoring the largely symbolic nature of this outreach. Structural inefficiencies also became evident: 400 staff members were responsible for teaching just 80 cadets. Many of the linguists trained in the 1990s had since left the armed forces, leaving gaps in expertise. While some capabilities in German and Chinese instruction existed, English — critical for NATO interoperability — was one of the weakest areas. The last shipment of new textbooks reportedly arrived in 2005.

Despite its designation as a PfP Regional Center, the institute’s cooperation with NATO in practice amounted mainly to assistance in establishing a library. In this sense, McDermott suggests that the PfP status of the DIFL carried more political than practical value. He concludes that, while the creation of the institute was a significant initiative, the challenges in governance, staffing, and curriculum development meant that DIFL itself would require substantial further reform to fulfill its intended role.

Searching for New Defense Partners. 

Since 9/11, Kazakhstan has expanded the scope of its international military cooperation, moving beyond its traditional reliance on Russia and, to a lesser degree, China, to engage more actively with Western and other partners. The United States and Turkey have been at the forefront of this cooperation, with Canada, Germany, and the UK also increasing their support. Denmark, France, Norway, Slovakia, and Spain have developed ties with Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense, while in defense technology Israel has primarily promoted cooperation among defense firms to enhance Kazakhstan’s domestic arms industry. Since the tenure of Defense Minister Daniyal Akhmetov, Kazakhstan has also diversified cooperation within the CIS, for example, repairing aircraft or sending cadets to military academies in countries such as Azerbaijan and Belarus.

Alongside expanding its cooperation with Western states and NATO, Kazakhstan has sought to develop defense ties with other regions. A notable trend has been the strengthening of relations with Middle Eastern and Asian countries, including Israel and Pakistan. In February 2008, during a meeting between Pakistan’s Caretaker Federal Minister for Defense and Defense Production, Syed Salim Abbas Jilani, and Kazakhstan’s Admiral Ratmir Komratov, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to bilateral defense cooperation. They agreed to hold additional high-level meetings, train Kazakhstani personnel, and promote naval cooperation. Similarly, in April 2008, Defense Minister Akhmetov and his Slovakian counterpart Jaroslav Baska signed an agreement on military and technical cooperation, under which Slovakia would repair training aircraft for Kazakhstan’s air defense forces and train junior officers in Liptovsky Mikulas and the NATO PfP Center.

According to McDermott, these initiatives illustrate Kazakhstan’s pragmatic approach to building a wide network of defense partnerships. The trend is driven less by political alignment and more by practical needs, particularly the repair and maintenance of aging hardware. For instance, fighter jets have been repaired in Belarus and training aircraft in Slovakia. Unless Kazakhstan undertakes a major procurement of new airframes, this reliance on external partners for maintenance is expected to continue for the next decade or more.

One unintended outcome of this diversification, McDermott notes, is that states not traditionally aligned with Western preferences are nonetheless increasing their influence over Kazakhstan’s armed forces. U.S. planners argue that military assistance helps promote democratic values and civil-military oversight, and since 2003 roughly 400 Kazakhstani officers have received education or training in U.S. military institutions. Yet, many of these officers face obstacles upon return, with some sidelined within the system or leaving the armed forces altogether. By contrast, in September 2008 Kazakhstan began sending 50 officer cadets to study at the military academy in Minsk. In comparative terms, Belarus now exerts a greater influence over Kazakhstan’s officer education than the United States — a development that highlights the complexity of Astana’s diversified military partnerships.

Endemic Challenges.

The issue of pay, traditionally highlighted in official statements, resurfaced more prominently in the rhetoric adopted by Defense Minister Akhmetov. In October 2007, he promised to double the salaries of contract servicemen starting in 2008, raising them to 70,000 Tenge per month (around $580). Akhmetov also pledged to address the equally sensitive matter of housing for military personnel, which had long been a source of dissatisfaction within the ranks involved in the experiment to “professionalize” the armed forces. “We will build 80,000 square meters of housing this year alone. At this rate, we will provide homes for 5,000 servicemen, who are currently in line, within three years,” the minister said.

Although some progress was reportedly achieved during the second tenure of Army General Mukhtar Altynbayev as Defense Minister, Akhmetov nevertheless presented a picture of an armed forces still facing multiple challenges: morale remained fragile, discipline inconsistent, pay relatively low, housing shortages acute, and military education underdeveloped. Indeed, he singled out education as a reform priority. “Funding for military education in Kazakhstan will increase 100-fold in 2008, from 47 million Tenge this year to 4.8 billion (about $40 million) next year,” Akhmetov announced. He noted that at that time only 12 percent of conscripts had graduated from military departments at civilian higher educational institutions. Akhmetov also added to his objectives the introduction of a NATO-standard uniform and improvements to the content and quality of dry rations for soldiers. As McDermott observed, these ambitious initiatives reflected the seriousness with which Akhmetov approached reform.

Yet, despite these declarations of intent, certain issues persisted in the perceptions of servicemen, particularly concerning pay and service conditions. Evidence suggested that this gap was especially pronounced at the crucial sergeant level — widely considered the backbone of Kazakhstan’s army and central to the professionalization process. In March 2008, following an emergency landing of a MiG-31 near Karaganda, the ensuing investigation revealed that many sergeants, discouraged by stagnant wages, were preparing to leave the army en masse in 2008–09. According to servicemen at the Forces of Air Defense units, “Wages of sergeants have become equal to, and sometimes even lower than, those of their subordinates.” Given their deputy commander responsibilities, the lack of additional benefits in the sergeants’ pay structure made these posts increasingly “unpromising,” raising concerns of a “massive retreat” of junior commanders from the army — a development that would pose a serious challenge to the MoD.

This situation was partly linked to the abolition of “sergeant bonuses,” which reduced financial allowances by up to 55 percent. For example, a sergeant with 17–20 years of service who previously earned 67,903 Tenge (about $560) across salary, rank allowance, and bonuses, found his income reduced to 47,642 Tenge (about $470) once bonuses were removed. Such measures created financial strain and lowered morale, complicating broader efforts to counter the persistence of corruption — a phenomenon that, as McDermott pointed out, had long been acknowledged as an endemic challenge within Kazakhstan’s armed forces.

Kazakhstan’s Closest Military And Security Ally

National and multilateral Western military planning staffs would benefit from a nuanced understanding of the constraints that shape the potential outcomes of defense cooperation and assistance programs offered to the Kazakhstani armed forces. Among the most important of these constraints are the depth, scope, and long-term resilience of Kazakhstan’s defense and security ties with the Russian Federation. These relations are grounded in deep historical, linguistic, and cultural links, reinforced by a shared military tradition that encompasses doctrine, strategy, tactics, training systems, equipment, force structure, and—perhaps most significantly—operational mindset.

This foundational relationship is articulated in Kazakhstan’s 2007 military doctrine and sustained by an enduring pattern of bilateral defense cooperation. It is further reinforced through multilateral organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where Kazakhstan plays an active and supportive role. Notably, Kazakhstan has consistently aligned with Russian security positions and is widely regarded in Moscow as its most reliable strategic partner among former Soviet republics.

As McDermott suggests, the character and depth of this cooperation merit careful scrutiny. Although there has been a prevailing perception in NATO capitals since 2005 that Kazakhstan is increasingly receptive to engagement with the Alliance through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and in bilateral relations with NATO member states, the evidence suggests that Kazakhstan’s defense ties with Russia have, in fact, significantly deepened during this period.

A realistic understanding of this relationship is vital when designing or calibrating Western military cooperation programs with Kazakhstan. It is on this point that many such efforts encounter limitations. Put simply, for every Kazakhstani officer who is open-minded or even enthusiastic about Western military ideas and practices, there are significantly more—perhaps as many as nine—who remain skeptical and prefer to adhere to the entrenched “Russian outlook” that continues to define much of the operational culture within the Kazakhstani armed forces.

Moreover, there have been cases where officers trained in NATO countries return to Kazakhstan only to find their career progression stalled. Rather than being positioned to share their insights and contribute to modernization efforts, they may find themselves sidelined—an outcome that reflects institutional conservatism and a preference for continuity with established Russian-oriented norms.

While Kazakhstan’s defense policy has, at times, embraced the rhetoric of “military reform” and sought selective engagement with Western partners to support these ambitions, the practical outcomes indicate that the country remains closely aligned with Russia in both policy and worldview. This alignment was clearly articulated in December 2003, when then-Defense Minister Mukhtar Altynbayev stated:

“I want to emphasize that military-technical cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan is a priority since our army is equipped with hardware and arms of Soviet and Russian production. Our armed forces have the demand for supplies of air, armored vehicles, military trucks, missile and artillery armament, air defense technologies and spare parts and other parts needed for their maintenance and servicing from Russia.”

Kazakhstan-Russia Defense Cooperation: Actively Growing

Following the announcement in February 2008 of the renewed U.S.-Kazakhstan Five-Year Plan for military cooperation (2008–2013), Kazakhstan concurrently strengthened its defense partnership with Russia. On February 12, 2008, Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and his Kazakhstani counterpart, Daniyal Akhmetov, agreed on a wide-ranging program through which Kazakhstan would purchase and modernize military equipment in Russia during 2008–2010. Talks held in Moscow during Akhmetov’s official visit laid the groundwork for enhanced cooperation in military education, science, weapons systems procurement, maintenance, and joint training exercises.

According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense, the two ministers discussed a series of initiatives designed to energize bilateral defense cooperation. These included favorable terms for weapons deliveries and maintenance, joint operational training, and greater coordination in military education. Notably, Akhmetov proposed that Russian defense institutions—including the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation and various military academies—participate in the selection of Kazakhstani cadets for study in Russian military universities.

In the long term, Kazakhstan planned to send officers posted abroad to attend short-term training at the Russian Military Academy. Course content was expected to include international legal frameworks for defense attachés, operational area studies, and personal security. According to the MoD’s press release:

“As a part of the joint operations training program, it is planned to hold several military exercises this year. The cooperation in responding to the challenges and dangers of today may not only bring together the two country’s military personnel, but it will also build up their experience in conducting combat operations.”

During the same visit, Akhmetov met with Anatoliy Isaykin, Director General of Rosoboronexport, to discuss military training, arms supplies, maintenance, modernization, and access to Russian defense technology on preferential terms. Plans were also made to send Kazakhstani defense attachés on short-term training courses to Russia’s Frunze Military Academy—an indication, perhaps, of Astana’s continued preference for familiarizing its officers with Russian military thinking prior to their foreign assignments.

It is also important to note that all Western military cooperation programs with Kazakhstan are effectively transparent to Moscow, due to the existing CSTO mechanisms and the close intelligence ties maintained between the two countries. The cornerstone of this enhanced bilateral relationship remains the acquisition of Russian weapons on preferential terms and a commitment to increasing the frequency and sophistication of joint military exercises—developments that indicate growing political will for possible future joint operations under CSTO auspices.

"Center 2008": Rehearsing for a Future Contingency?

On September 4, 2008, Russian and Kazakhstani troops began joint exercises at the Chebarkul training range in Russia’s Chelyabinsk region. “Center 2008,” as the operation was called, was part of the deepening defense cooperation framework and involved around 2,000 troops, over 100 armored vehicles, and 30 aircraft (including MiG-31, Su-24, Su-27, and Il-76 aircraft, and Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters). What set this exercise apart was its unprecedented scale and its scenario—one involving the repulsion of an attack on Kazakhstan by an unnamed “adjacent state.”

As McDermott observes, this scenario stands in contrast to Kazakhstan’s 2007 military doctrine, which identifies international terrorism—not conventional state aggression—as the primary security threat. The decision to simulate a state-on-state conflict, particularly one involving the defense of Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure, raises questions about the perceived source of threat and the nature of potential future joint operations.

Russia’s contribution included the deployment of precision-guided munitions—capabilities not employed during the actual military campaign in Georgia in August 2008—while Kazakhstan provided reinforcement units using Soviet-era BMPs and BTRs. The exercise concluded with a coordinated Russian-Kazakhstani military response, culminating in the notional defeat of the aggressor and the imposition of peace on an entire military bloc. The political messaging behind such an exercise was unmistakable.

The Defense-Minded Vector in Kazakhstan's Multi-Vector Policy

Kazakhstan’s celebrated “multi-vector” foreign policy, which emphasizes balancing relationships among major powers, often creates an impression of neutrality in international affairs. However, within the Ministry of Defense, the scope for ambiguity appears far more limited.

In May 2008, Minister Akhmetov stated unequivocally:

“Russia’s armed forces are the main strategic ally of the Kazakh armed forces. I can say that, of late, interaction between our establishments in all spheres of military-technological and military-humanitarian cooperation has been considerably stepped up and taken to a qualitatively new level.”

He elaborated on the deepening defense ties with Moscow, including the organization of two large-scale joint exercises in 2008 (the first in several years), expanded naval cooperation, closer integration of air defense systems and air forces, and the prioritization of Russian-made weapons systems across all branches of the Kazakh military. Under Akhmetov’s leadership, the MoD appeared increasingly committed to aligning Kazakhstan’s military development with Russia’s, reflecting a view that such cooperation was essential for the armed forces’ modernization.

“We are satisfied with this cooperation, as we understand that our armed forces will improve only in partnership with Russia,” Akhmetov concluded.

Kazakhstani experts echo this sentiment. In February 2008, Bulat Sultanov, Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, argued that Russia—as a nuclear power—acts as a guarantor of Kazakhstan’s national security. In his view, Kazakhstan also plays a stabilizing role for Russia in Central Asia while serving as a strategic bridge to Asia. Sultanov further noted that under President Putin, Kazakhstan-Russia relations reached “a new level of strategic partnership and have a trend towards becoming allied relations.”

Military Doctrine

Kazakhstan’s second military doctrine, passed in 2000, gradually became outdated as a result of the changing security environment following 9/11 and was therefore in need of revision. President Nazarbayev committed Kazakhstan to formulating a new military doctrine during his Annual Address to the Nation on March 1, 2006. The Secretariat of the Security Council was tasked with overseeing and drafting this doctrine, a process that involved consultations with international experts and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Among Western bodies, this included three experts from the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Germany, who visited Kazakhstan’s MoD in October 2006. One of those experts commended the draft doctrine for its “principles of openness and transparency.”

McDermott notes, however, that U.S. experts had also participated in the drafting of Kazakhstan’s 2000 military doctrine, attending sessions and engaging in detailed discussion on the principles of forming doctrine. When the 2000 doctrine was eventually adopted, many of these experts were reportedly “surprised” at the extent to which the final version diverged from earlier drafts, with sections to which they had contributed being removed. In his view, the 2000 doctrine was disappointing, but it nevertheless provided an important insight into how Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense operates—presenting a “Western-friendly” image during drafting, while ultimately passing a document that reinforced close defense relations with Russia. Whether those involved in the 2007 drafting phase had a similar experience remains unclear.

What is clear from the 2007 doctrine, adopted in March that year, is that it underscored Kazakhstan’s ongoing defense relationship with Russia. Lieutenant-General Sembinov, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Defense Minister responsible for cooperation with the West, emphasized that Western experiences had been taken into account in its drafting.

The 2007 doctrine reiterated the need to create a mobile, well-equipped professional army, though this was described more as an aspiration than a reflection of current capabilities. It advocated combining military and nonmilitary measures to ensure security and envisaged Kazakhstan’s active participation in the War on Terror and international peacekeeping operations. This was consistent with the country’s contribution since 2003 of 27 engineers from its peace support battalion, KAZBAT, deployed in Iraq under Polish command with U.S. logistical support.

In terms of international cooperation, the doctrine mentioned Russia, China, Central Asian neighbors, CSTO, SCO, UN, OSCE, NATO, the EU, and the United States—in that order. McDermott stresses that the sequence itself is significant. While the doctrine highlighted Kazakhstan’s openness to cooperation with Western partners, including the EU, these commitments were framed within Astana’s legal and political obligations to prioritize Russia, maintain constructive ties with China, and actively engage in CSTO and SCO structures. The language of threat assessment largely mirrored that of the CSTO and SCO. At the same time, the doctrine aligned with Kazakhstan’s ambition to secure the OSCE Chairmanship, which it achieved shortly after. According to McDermott, these ambitions were visible in the doctrine, though he also underlines the gap between the goals set out in the document and the realities of Kazakhstan’s armed forces. References to regional defense leadership, while politically useful, exceeded Kazakhstan’s actual capacity, which continued to require substantive reform. Even official rhetoric has since moderated these more ambitious claims.

Recent Historical Basis for a Close Partnership with Russia

Kazakhstan’s close defense ties with Russia are rooted in history and doctrine. A military cooperation treaty was signed with Russia on March 28, 1994, and further agreements followed. Each year, Kazakhstan sends more officer cadets and officers to Russian military institutions than any other former Soviet state. Between 1993 and 2006, more than 2,500 Kazakhstanis received training through Russia’s MoD, FSB, SVR, and Emergencies Ministry. Kazakhstan’s own military education system drew heavily on Russian models, often relying on Russian instructors. Since 2003, Russian specialists have regularly taught at Kazakhstan’s National Defense University.

McDermott underlines that such arrangements presuppose a long-term commonality between Kazakhstani and Russian military doctrine. Beyond education and training, Kazakhstan provides Russia with extensive access to military facilities. This includes more than 11 million hectares of leased land, the Baikonur Cosmodrome (leased until 2050), and various testing ranges and radar facilities across Kazakhstan. These sites support Russian space launches, air force trials, and missile defense systems.

Russian defense companies also supply Kazakhstan with equipment on favorable terms, including BTR-80 APCs, Mi-17 helicopters, MiG-29, MiG-31 and Su-25 aircraft, and air defense systems. Agreements signed in February 2007 further consolidated Kazakhstan’s reliance on Russian defense procurement and modernization strategies.

Air Defense Cooperation

Air defense has long been treated as a particularly important issue by Kazakhstan’s defense leadership. Currently, S-300 systems protect key cities such as Astana and Karaganda. While Kazakhstan explored cooperation with Western firms like BAE Systems for modernization, Moscow remained its preferred partner. In February 2008, Army General Mukhtar Altynbayev led a delegation to Moscow to discuss expanding procurement of S-300 and possibly S-400 systems. Altynbayev emphasized a cautious approach to the S-400, given its expense and the need for Russian forces to fully test it first.

McDermott remarks that such negotiations reflect a recurring challenge for Kazakhstan’s MoD: protracted decision-making over procurement priorities, weighed heavily toward Russian systems. Kazakhstan’s interest in modernizing its air force and air defense was also tied to agreements granting Russia access to training ranges in Kazakhstan, with payments made in both cash and equipment.

This culminated in an agreement signed at MAKS 2007, where Kazakhstan purchased $60 million worth of Russian aviation and air-defense equipment, including modernization of MiG and Su aircraft and delivery of S-300 and S-400 systems. Altynbayev underscored the strategic importance of Russian defense cooperation, stating: “We are part of the CSTO. We have the same tasks, and we will focus on purchasing Russian military equipment in the future.”

S-400 (Triumph): Russian Defense Industry Success

The S-400 procurement was hailed by Almaz-Antey director Vladislav Menshchikov as a success, demonstrating the system’s export potential. He noted that existing S-300 customers were particularly keen to acquire the S-400 and stressed that the system was built entirely with domestic Russian components, reducing earlier vulnerabilities.

Still, McDermott questions what specific threats Kazakhstan seeks to counter with such high-end systems. He interprets this interest partly as Kazakhstan’s pursuit of symbols of prestige and technological sophistication, even in the absence of pressing external threats. Russian Air Force Commander Aleksandr Zelin, meanwhile, emphasized the S-400’s superior capabilities compared to systems like the U.S. Patriot, highlighting its mobility, rapid deployment, and effectiveness against low-altitude targets.

Aging Aircraft

Despite these acquisitions, Kazakhstan continues to face challenges with its Soviet-era aircraft. In February 2008, crashes involving a MiG-29 and a MiG-31—both attributed to technical failures—highlighted difficulties in maintaining aging fleets. Many of these aircraft are 25 years old or more. Russian plants, themselves lacking sufficient technical staff, have struggled to modernize them. Kazakhstan has sought alternative partners, such as Belarus, to repair older Su-27s.

McDermott points out that while such arrangements are often driven by necessity rather than strategic realignment, they underscore the enduring problems associated with reliance on legacy equipment. Crashes have generated negative publicity, raising concerns within Kazakhstan’s defense establishment.

Nevertheless, Defense Minister Akhmetov confirmed in 2007 that Russian-made equipment would remain the core of Kazakhstan’s arsenal. At the same time, he noted Kazakhstan’s willingness to diversify suppliers, pointing to new partnerships such as joint facilities with Israel to produce advanced artillery systems domestically. McDermott interprets this as part of Kazakhstan’s ambition not only to modernize but eventually to position itself as an arms producer and exporter within Central Asia.

 Overall, McDermott’s point of view demonstrates that Kazakhstan’s defense policy in the 2000s developed in a context of balancing between declared multilateral cooperation and actual dependence on Russia. The new military doctrines reflected Kazakhstan’s ambitions to assume a leadership role in Central Asia and to expand international cooperation, yet limited resources and institutional ties with Russia constrained these plans. In essence, as McDermott emphasizes, Russian influence remained the key factor shaping the trajectory of Kazakhstan’s defense policy.